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ABSTRACT
Bruce Ackerman speaks in two voices. He is one of the most prominent students of
comparative constitutionalism. But Ackerman is far better known for his imaginative
theory of American constitutional development, set out in We the People. Ackerman
observes that notwithstanding a remarkable continuity in governing constitutions,
American constitutional history can be sharply divided into distinct regimes. His
contribution is his account of the process whereby the transitions between these different
constitutional regimes have taken place: through a process of “higher lawmaking” which
fails to comply with the written legal rules governing constitutional amendment in Article
V.
Although Ackerman is one of the most widely-discussed constitutional theorists of his
generation, what has never been observed is the underlying disagreement within his work
about the relevance of comparative analysis for constitutional scholarship. While
Ackerman the comparativist lambastes American constitutional scholars for their
“emphatic provincialism”, Ackerman in We the People calls on American constitutional
scholars issues a nationalist call to American constitutional scholars to ground their
theories of the American constitution in domestic political practice and to ignore
comparative experiences.
This article is the first attempt to reconcile the two strands of Ackerman’s work. It asks
whether other constitutional systems experience constitutional moments, and what we
can learn about constitutional moments from studying them both inside and outside the
United States.
This comparative move is possible only if we accept a completely new account of what
lies at the core of constitutional moments – an extra-legal constitutional change resorted
to as a direct consequence of the failure of formal rules of constitutional amendment.
Amending rules are designed to constitute and regulate constitutional politics without
becoming part of it. To perform this function, rules for constitutional amendment must
be regarded as standing outside the terrain of substantive constitutional politics, and as
being indifferent among the competing constitutional positions at play. This attitude will
become most difficult to sustain when those rules reflect one of the competing,
substantive constitutional positions on the table. The Founding and the Reconstruction –
two of Ackerman’s constitutional moments – may have been such occasions.
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A. Introduction: Ackerman’s Two Voices
Will the real Bruce Ackerman stand up? Is there a real Bruce Ackerman—or only
a bunch of multiple, if partial, identities that don’t add up over time?1
Bruce Ackerman is a constitutional scholar who speaks in two voices. Over the last
decade, he has emerged as one of the most prominent scholars of comparative constitutionalism
in the American legal academy. His 1992 book, The Future of Liberal Revolution, made a
passionate case for the viability of a constitutionalism that was liberal democratic to its core in the
former communist countries of Eastern Europe, even though their concrete, lived experiences
with liberal democracy were distant or non-existent, and their revolutionary political transitions
were seemingly antithetical to the liberal constitutional ideal.2 He continued in 1997, examining
the proliferation of written constitutions and judicial review, which he termed “the rise of world
constitutionalism”.3 His research question was how the character of a constitutional founding –
for example, the coming together of independent political units in a federation, or a “new
beginning” marking a sharp and self-conscious break with a discredited past – might influence the
subsequent direction and content of constitutional judicial review, and hence serve as guidance
for prospective constitutional design. Most recently, he made an extended argument in the pages
of the Harvard Law Review for the superiority of “constrained parliamentarism” over an
American-style separation of powers as a method for the allocation of institutional power and
fashioning relationships between the executive and legislative branches.4
But Bruce Ackerman is arguably far better known, even outside the United States, for his
imaginative theory of American constitutional development, set out in a highly influential series
of law review articles5 and the first two volumes of an anticipated three-volume work, We the
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People.6 Ackerman’s theory has both descriptive and normative limbs. Descriptively, he argues
that notwithstanding a remarkable continuity in governing constitutions, the American
constitution has undergone tremendous change since the adoption of the Federalist constitution.
American constitutional history can be sharply divided into distinct regimes, each defined by a
unique “matrix of institutional relationships and fundamental values”.7 Ackerman’s original
contribution is his account of the process whereby the transitions between these different
constitutional regimes have taken place: through a process of “higher lawmaking” involving
intense and relatively brief periods of focused and public-spirited deliberation by the American
people, a complex but determinate pattern of interaction between America’s governing
institutions recognized by those institutional actors and the public as being unique to transitions
between constitutional regimes, and most arrestingly, the failure to comply with the written legal
rules governing constitutional amendment. Normatively, he argues that the American story of
constitutional change – “dualist democracy” – is a practical response to the limited capacity of
citizens in a modern democracy to truly engage in democratic self-government, because it only
expects them to engage in collective political choice relatively rarely. And since it is only at
these “constitutional moments” that the American people have truly spoken, and because there
are clear criteria to determine when such moments have occurred, dualist democracy also offers a
path out of the thicket of the counter-majoritarian objection to judicial review. No doubt because
of its scope and ambition, Ackerman’s theory has led one scholar to suggest that Ackerman
“undoubtedly” belongs to the “pantheon of constitutional theorists”.8
Although Ackerman’s constitutional scholarship has been widely discussed, what has
escaped observation is that the two strands of his work are deeply in tension. The differences are
not simply those of subject-matter (American vs. non-American constitutionalism), potential
audience (American constitutional theorists vs. scholars of comparative constitutionalism), and
the balance between depth and breadth (in-depth discussion of the American constitutional
system vs. less detailed discussion of many). Rather, these readily apparent differences both
reflect and mask a deeper, underlying disagreement within Ackerman’s own work about the
relevance of comparative analysis for constitutional scholarship.
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Consider Ackerman the comparativist. In characteristically polemical fashion, Ackerman
lambastes American constitutional scholars for their “emphatic provincialism” and their
“astonishing indifference” toward constitutional developments abroad.9 He derides American
scholars for “grappling with the original understanding of the Constitution of 1787, the Bill of
Rights, and the Reconstruction Amendments with new intensity”10 at the expense of comparative
scholarship. The intellectual agenda for American scholars should be to “learn to think about the
American experience in a different way … to look upon the American experience as a special
case, not as the paradigmatic case”.11 The benefit of situating the American constitutional system
in comparative perspective, argues Ackerman, is that it “helps American constitutional lawyers
place their own tradition in critical perspective” to enable to step back from the audacious claim
that the American system is “an inspiring beacon for liberal democrats everywhere”.12
Now these criticisms surely apply to Ackerman’s own work on the American
constitution, which focuses entirely on the United States, and methodologically is selfconsciously grounded in the concrete details of American constitutional and political history with
only scattered and brief comparative references. It is therefore striking that at the very outset of
Foundations, Ackerman argues against the use of “European … conceptual frameworks” in a
well-known passage:13
To discover the Constitution, we must approach it without the assistance of some
philosophical guide imported from another time and place. Neither Aristotle nor
Cicero, Montesquieu nor Locke, Harrington nor Hume, Kant nor Weber,
provides the key. Americans have borrowed much from such thinkers, but they
have also built up a genuinely distinctive pattern of constitutional thought and
practice.
Ackerman’s target is the reliance by normative constitutional theorists on European political
thought. But by issuing a nationalist call to American scholars to ground their theories of the
American constitution in indigenous political practice, his methodological choice also rules out
the resort to comparative legal materials. As Ackerman goes on say, “we must look inward, not
outward”14 – advice which he follows in Transformations, notwithstanding its appearance after
9
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the comparative turn in his own scholarship. To be sure, Ackerman does make some comparative
moves. In Foundations, he briefly compares the design of the American, English, and German
constitutions, noting that the German is “foundationalist” because certain basic values are
entrenched and placed beyond the reach of constitutional revision, the English is “monist”
because Parliamentary supremacy means that no fundamental values legally restrain legislative
decision-making, and the American is “dualist” because binding legal constraints on governments
are open to democratic revision in their entirety.15 But his usual approach is to emphasize the
uniqueness of the American constitutional experience without the benefit of real comparison, if at
all.16 The comparative perspective is at best a superfluous after-thought that does no real work, a
rhetorical footnote to a complex and extended argument.
Reconciling the two strands of Ackerman’s scholarly agenda would appear to be an
unpromising project, given Ackerman’s firm anchoring of his theory of constitutional change in
the particularities of American constitutional history. But I think such an exercise, if framed the
right way, can prove to be fruitful. Indeed, Ackerman has already attempted to make such a link
between his two research agendas, arguing that constrained parliamentarianism is a better
constitutional model for dualist democracy than the American version of the separation of
powers.17 But surprisingly, he makes this connection between his comparative and American
agendas without a sustained engagement with his argument in We the People. Sandy Levinson’s
insightful discussion of We the People as a case-study of the broader phenomenon of transitional
justice, drawing on a rich set of comparative examples, points the way to how this might be
done.18
I want to establish a different potential point of contact between Ackerman the
comparativist and Ackerman the theorist of the American constitution, by focussing on his
descriptive, as opposed to his normative argument. Moreover, I want to probe that possible
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connection through a deeper engagement with the argument presented in We the People – in a
way, to take Ackerman more seriously than Ackerman himself. I take Ackerman’s central
contribution to the study of American constitutional change to be the idea of the constitutional
moment. So how would taking to heart Ackerman’s insistence on the importance of comparative
constitutional scholarship affect our understanding of constitutional moments? We can derive
some guidance from Ackerman’s study of the impact of the character of constitutional framings
on constitutional interpretation, where he poses the following general comparative question: “are
there patterns that repeat themselves in the successful establishment of written constitutions?”19
Adapted to constitutional moments, the question is the descriptive one of whether other
constitutional systems experience constitutional moments, and what we can learn about
constitutional moments from studying them both inside and outside the United States.
This comparative move is possible only if we first fundamentally recast our
understanding of constitutional moments. The critical literature prompted by We the People has
persuasively argued that Ackerman has failed to adduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate that
political actors were self-consciously engaged in a process of higher law-making outside normal
constitutional process which nonetheless they perceived to be legal. However, if shorn of this
unsustainable empirical claim, at the core of constitutional moments is the following phenomenon
– an extra-legal constitutional change resorted to as a direct consequence of the failure of formal
rules of constitutional amendment designed to constitute and regulate constitutional politics
without becoming part of it. Those rules fail in situations where they cannot perform their central
function, which is to channel debates over constitutional change through procedures that yield
institutional decisions which political actors accept as authoritative. To perform this function,
rules for constitutional amendment must be regarded as standing outside the terrain of substantive
constitutional politics, and as being indifferent among the competing constitutional positions at
play. But constitution decision-procedures are far from substantively neutral themselves, and
reflect competing conceptions of the very sorts of values that are the gist of constitutional politics.
Constitutionalism depends, then, on the suspension of political judgment with respect to rules
governing constitutional amendment to purchase political settlement. This attitude will become
most difficult to sustain when those rules reflect one of the competing, substantive constitutional
positions on the table – at special moments of constitutive constitutional politics. At that point,
because of the absence of accepted rules governing constitutional amendment, the constitutional
system may come tumbling down.
19
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At least two of Ackerman’s constitutional moments -- the Founding and the
Reconstruction -- may have been such cases, because the rules governing constitutional
amendment in the Articles of Confederation and Article V reflected one of the substantive visions
of the American political community which was at play in those episodes, and therefore were not
capable of regulating the process of constitutional change. So some of Ackerman’s constitutional
moments are in reality moments of constitutive constitutional politics, the very character of which
lead to constitutional failure and breakdown. As a consequence, Ackerman should be read not as
a theorist of constitutional change proceeding through mass democratic mobilization. Rather,
Ackerman should be read as a theorist of constitutional crisis.
Thus re-interpreted, constitutional moments raise a new and interesting avenue for
comparative inquiry that Ackerman himself does not pursue. I tackle this line of inquiry through
an examination of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Secession Reference20 – a
judgment reported the day after it was handed down on page A3 of the New York Times,
reflecting the considerable international interest in the case. The Court was asked a narrow
question on the constitutionality of unilateral secession by a province from the Canadian
federation, in the context of a highly charged disagreement between the Quebec and federal
governments over the answer to that question, and indeed, on the role of the law itself in
governing regime change. In a highly unusual judgment, the Court gave a narrow and
unsurprising ruling that declared unilateral secession to be unconstitutional, and in addition,
established a new constitutional procedure for secession which imposed a duty on the federal
government to negotiate the terms of secession in good faith in the event of a referendum vote by
a clear majority of Quebecers in favour of a clear question on secession.
Although framed as constitutional interpretation, I argue that the Court actually amended
the Canadian constitution, without recourse to the formal procedures for constitutional
amendment. Viewing the Secession Reference as the judicial component of a constitutional
moment – understood as a constitutional failure – offers a completely new understanding of that
episode. The impasse between the Canadian and Quebec governments over the secession of
Quebec thrust the rules for constitutional amendment under the Canadian constitution – the
constitutional framework within which secession would occur – into constitutional politics.
Those rules failed because they reflected a conception of the Canadian political community which
the Quebec sovereignty movement challenged. Instead of providing a stable and uncontested
framework for constitutional politics, those rules were drawn into constitutional politics, and were
20
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unable to perform their basic function. This deep and profound constitutional failure offers a new
explanation for the Court’s otherwise puzzling move to amend the Canadian constitution extralegally under the guise of constitutional interpretation – a move fuelled because of the political
impossibility of formal constitutional amendment to craft an acceptable procedure to govern the
secession of a province.
In sum, the reinterpretation of constitutional moments as extra-legal responses to
constitutional failure serves a number of intellectual projects. It assists us in better understanding
what is at the core of Ackerman’s account of extra-legal changes to the American constitutional
order. It defines the comparative constitutional research agenda of identifying and better
understanding similar episodes of extra-legal change in other legal systems. It brings the two
halves of Ackerman’s constitutional scholarship together, potentially yielding further dividends
for the understanding of American constitutional development through comparative constitutional
scholarship. Finally, it extends Ackerman’s work on constitutional design to encompass rules for
constitutional amendment, and suggests that such rules may have a limited ability to constrain
moments of constitutive constitutional politics which raise questions going to the very identity of
a political community.
B. Understanding Constitutional Moments
1. Ackerman’s Higher Lawmaking System
As Terrance Sandalow has written, “[t]he fulcrum of Ackerman’s thesis is the problem of
constitutional change.”21 Ackerman begins by describing what he calls the “bicentennial myth”,22
whose key claim is one of American constitutional continuity. Ackerman makes this point
comparatively, contrasting how for “Europeans, the past two centuries are full of dramatic breaks
and false starts”.23 According to the bicentennial myth, the American constitutional experience
has been different. Although Americans, like Europeans, “have had … [their] share of bitter
conflict and profound transformation”, these have occurred within a constitutional framework that
has remained constant since the adoption of the Federalist Constitution in 1787.24 As Ackerman
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says, “[w]hile the French have run through five republics since 1789, we have lived in only
one”.25
The problem with the bicentennial myth is that it does not fit the facts of American
constitutional development, which has been one of dramatic constitutional change. Ackerman
suggests that notwithstanding the myth of constitutional continuity, legal professionals organize
their descriptions of their constitutional past around three pivotal moments – the Founding, the
Reconstruction, and the New Deal – which “stand out from the rest”.26 Ackerman suggests that
each of these momentous events launched a distinct constitutional regime, differing with regard to
constitutional structures and “fundamental values that are usually taken as the constitutional
baseline in normal political life”27 from the regimes both preceding it and following it. The
Founding launched the Early Republic, which was characterized by a weak Presidency, a national
government with limited jurisdiction, and minimal protection for fundamental rights.
Reconstruction marked the starting point of the Middle Republic, the core commitments of which
included national citizenship based on equal rights of contract and property, restricted national
power except to protect those rights of national citizenship, and Congressional leadership within
the national government. Finally, the New Deal constitutional settlement expanded national
power to encompass plenary jurisdiction over economic regulation, brought an end to the
aggressive judicial protection of rights of contract and property, and marked the rise of
Presidential leadership in the national government.
Now as Ackerman fully acknowledges, the fact of dramatic constitutional change over
time does not represent a challenge to the bicentennial myth per se, because the 1787 Constitution
itself contemplates the possibility of constitutional modification through Article V, which creates
a set of procedures that enables constitutional change to occur. The precise details of Article V
are not important. What is important is the idea underlying Article V – that proposed
constitutional amendments must satisfy one of the decision-rules spelled out therein to become
part of the Constitution and legally enforceable. The twenty-six amendments to the U.S.
Constitution bear vivid testimony to the fact that Article V can be and has been used successfully.
Although Article V does not explicitly indicate that it is the exclusive mechanism for
constitutional amendment, one could plausibly argue, with Larry Tribe, that it flows from the
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logic of a written constitution that it should be read in this way.28 If one accepts that a principal
goal of a written constitution is to provide a set of clear restraints on the exercise of public power,
dispensing with the rules governing constitutional amendment can subvert the goals of
constitutionalism itself, and lead to tyranny. Indeed, Ackerman recognizes this, describing one
argument for amendment outside Part V as “dangerous”.29 The implication is that amendments
which fail to satisfy Article V do not become part of the Constitution, at least in that way. The
fact that constitutional interpretation may eventually change constitutional meaning to accord
with failed amendments does not retroactively change the legal significance of the failure to
formally amend the constitution.
But as Ackerman acutely observes, this “legalist” explanation of constitutional change
cannot account for the transitions between the three constitutional regimes. It was widely
understood at the time that the adoption of the 1787 Constitution did not comply with the
procedure for constitutional amendment under the Articles of Confederation in several respects -its requirement of unanimous ratification by state legislatures obviously not being satisfied by the
approval of nine state conventions. There were other potential illegalities as well.30 Now the
illegality of the Founding is hardly a novel point; indeed, it was a central concern of political
actors at the time, as Ackerman vividly illustrates.31 But Ackerman argues that the birth of the
Middle Republic, especially the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was also illegal under
Article V. Once Congress proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, Article V required ratification
by two-thirds of the then thirty-seven states – granting twelve states a veto. Ten former members
of the Confederacy rejected the amendment, seemingly assuring that it would fail. To secure the
passage of the amendment, Congress refused to seat members of Congress from each southern
state until that state had ratified the amendment and the amendment had received a sufficient
number of ratifications to come into force. These conditions appear to contravene Article V,
which permits Congress to propose amendments to states for ratification, but not to coerce states
into accepting them. Again, as Ackerman documents, the historical record reveals that there was
an acute awareness among political actors of the problematic legality of the Fourteenth
28
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Amendment.32 Finally, and most controversially, Ackerman argues that the “transformative
opinions”33 of the New Deal, which severely circumscribed constitutional protection for rights of
property and contract and dramatically expanded the scope of national jurisdiction to regulate the
economy, were such a dramatic and sudden break with existing jurisprudence that they amounted
to constitutional amendments. To distinguish the Fourteenth Amendment and the transformative
opinions of the New Deal from Article V amendments, Ackerman deploys special terminology.
The Fourteenth Amendment is an “amendment-simulacrum”, because it is identical in form to a
formal constitutional amendment, whereas the transformative opinions of the New Deal are
“amendment-analogues”, which despite their lack of textual embodiment, are functionally
equivalent to Article V amendments.34
In sum, at the heart of Ackerman’s theory is the following problem: America’s
constitutional development contains many examples of fundamental, dramatic constitutional
change that appear to have occurred outside the textually-prescribed procedures for constitutional
amendment. Technically speaking, those constitutional changes are legally invalid. And to the
extent that these changes have marked the beginning of new constitutional regimes, Ackerman
frames the central problem of American constitutional law as coming to terms with illegal regime
change, or as Commonwealth constitutional theorists would say, revolutionary legality. Now the
easy solution to this difficulty is to say that there is not really a problem at all. If one works
within a positivist understanding of the nature of a legal system, claims of extra-legal
constitutional change do limited work after a point. According to positivist jurisprudence, a
constitutional order consists of legal rules whose validity can be traced to a constitution (written
or unwritten), whose validity in turn is determined by an ultimate rule of recognition.35 But when
we get to the rule of recognition, the chain of validity runs out. The rule of recognition can be
neither valid nor invalid, because validity is a property of rules within a legal order that requires
reference to a higher rule, which is not possible with respect to the rule of recognition itself.
Although Kelsen argued that the validity of the rule of recognition (his grundnorm) is
presupposed, Hart rightly pointed out that validity is an internal statement about the relationship
32
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of rules within a legal system and the rule of recognition. The better view is that the rule of
recognition merely exists, as a matter of sociological fact – defined by Hart as acceptance by the
officials who govern themselves by it.36
This perspective on the ultimate root or title of a constitutional order raises a host of
interesting issues that we must bracket for the moment. These include whose acceptance and
what kind of acceptance must be met for a rule of recognition to “exist”, and what the political,
historical, economic and cultural reasons for such an acceptance might be. The point that matters
here, as Fred Schauer has explained, is that just as a constitution in its entirety can be displaced
by a new constitution which becomes legally effective regardless of the failure to comply with the
formal legal rules for constitutional change of the previous constitutional order, because it has
secured the requisite degree of official acceptance under a new rule of recognition, so too can
partial modifications to the American constitution – whether in the form of amendment-analogues
(e.g. the Fourteenth Amendment) or amendment-simulacra (such as the New Deal decisions) –
become legally effective notwithstanding the failure to comply with formalities for constitutional
change spelled out by Article V. 37 This is true either because the rule of recognition permitted
amendment outside the formal legal order prior to those changes occurring, or (more likely)
because that rule was modified to accept such changes. Crucially, such changes to the rule of
recognition itself, in the positivist view, albeit of legal consequence, are analytically distinct from
and prior to law. They are conditioned by a range of political, moral, and other factors that are
best described as non-legal in character. In the American case, Ackerman’s focus on the federal
government suggests that the requisite degree of acceptance might entail acquiescence by the
principal institutions of the federal government – Congress, the Presidency, and the Supreme
Court for a range of non-legal reasons. In sum, although constitutions purport to be entirely selfvalidating and to regulate constitutional change through law, that is a rhetorical, not a legal
statement that mis-describes and obscures a political practice of acquiescence, not only for
constitutions themselves but also for constitutional modifications that are functionally equivalent
to formal amendments but which do not comply with constitutional formalities.38
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Whatever the merits of the argument from revolutionary legality, Ackerman rejects it. To
understand why, consider his rejection of a reading of Article V that would make it the exclusive
means of constitutional amendment. Ackerman asks “[w]hy, then, read such a demand into the
text at the cost of delegitimizing the Fourteenth Amendment?”39 Ackerman’s worry appears to be
that accepting the revolutionary and extra-legal nature of the regime changes wrought by the
Reconstruction and New Deal would somehow undermine the legitimacy of those changes. In
other words, to Ackerman, legality is at least a sufficient criterion for legitimacy, such that
constitutional change brought about without recourse to legal procedure would be illegitimate.
And to the extent that these moments of gross illegality launched entire constitutional regimes,
those regimes themselves would be illegitimate as well – a problem Ackerman terms “the
problem of revolutionary legitimacy”.40
Ackerman resolves the dilemma for political legitimacy posed by revolutionary legality
by describing a legal process whereby these apparently extra-legal changes have occurred, his
system of so-called higher lawmaking -- “a third way”41 that rejects the “dichotomy between
legalistic perfection and lawless force”,42 which shows that “law-breaking does not necessarily
imply lawlessness,”43 and indeed, produces constitutional “amendment”.44 This parallel process
exists alongside Article V, and is thus an alternative but equally effective mechanism for
constitutional change. So what does higher lawmaking look like? Ackerman describes a highly
stylized and complicated set of interactions involving both popular mobilization in favour of
constitutional change and “institutional jujitsu”45 between the branches of the federal government.
First, there is “signalling”, whereby a movement “earns the constitutional authority to claim that
… its reform agenda should be placed at the center of sustained public scrutiny”.46 This is
followed by the “proposal”, during which the popular movement must translate its calls for
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change “into a series of more or less operational proposals for constitutional reform”.47 Next
comes “mobilized deliberation”, which itself consists of a series of sub-stages: a “constitutional
impasse” between different branches of the federal government, reflecting resistance by
conservative branches to the proposed constitutional changes; a “decisive electoral mandate” for
the institutional proponents of revolutionary constitutional change; an “unconventional assault”
by proponents on the conservative institutions; a “switch in time” by dissenting institutions to
endorse the constitutional change; and a “consolidating election” in which the public ratifies this
inter-institutional settlement.48 The final stage is “legal codification”, where the Supreme Court
translates the constitutional reform into constitutional doctrine.
According to Ackerman, the requirements of this higher law-making system were met by
the Founding, the Reconstruction and the New Deal, solving his dilemma by providing a legal
basis of legitimation for each of these episodes. This is true even though at various times,
different institutions played different roles (e.g. Congressional leadership during the
Reconstruction, and Presidential leadership during the New Deal), and different instruments of
constitutional change were used (e.g. amendment-analogues in the Reconstruction vs.
amendment-simulacra in the New Deal), which Ackerman explains as procedural innovations and
acts of higher law-making in their own right that occurred alongside the substantive changes
made during each constitutional moment to the American constitution.
2. Higher Lawmaking: Historical Fact or Legal Fiction?
Ackerman’s model has attracted a large literature, most of it highly critical both of its
normative desirability and descriptive accuracy.49 I want to focus on a central component of his
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descriptive claim – that the system of higher lawmaking was self-consciously understood as a
process for constitutional amendment by citizens and various institutional actors during the three
constitutional moments Ackerman identifies. In particular, Ackerman argues that the relevant
actors in each episode (a) were aware of the existence and particular features of a system of
higher law-making outside the formal procedures for constitutional amendment; (b) purposely
deployed this system in preference to proceeding through the textually-prescribed procedures for
constitutional amendment; (c) interpreted the actions of other actors through the lens of this
system; (d) viewed earlier constitutional moments as instances of higher lawmaking, and
understood themselves as following those “precedents” by engaging in the same constitutional
ritual; and (e) viewed any differences between their behaviour and that of political actors in
previous episodes as modifications or elaborations of the system and as departures from
constitutional precedent.
These are strong claims, but Ackerman is clear in making them. Consider a few
examples. At the outset of setting out his “revisionary narrative”50 in Foundations, Ackerman
describes how during the Reconstruction and the New Deal political actors self-consciously
worked within and developed the higher lawmaking process. According to Ackerman, the
“sources…. reveal both Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats engaging in selfconscious acts of constitutional creation”. 51 He continues, “[r]ather than meekly following the
marching orders of the Federalists, both Republicans and Democrats were constitutionally
creative procedurally no less than substantively – and they knew it”.52 In defending the
application of his higher lawmaking system to the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment,
Ackerman emphasizes the subjective understandings of the American people in deciding whether
to support a constitutional proposal: “[w]hile this framework may seem overly formulaic … the
American people could hardly be said to exercise their popular sovereignty without a credible
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signal that reformers were seriously planning a constitutional transformation, without learning the
outlines of the proposal, and so on”.53
Ackerman makes his strongest empirical claims with respect to the New Deal. Thus, in
describing the decision in Schechter Poultry Corporation v. United States,54 Ackerman says that
the Court’s “words … challenged the President to run against the Court in the next election and
seek to gain a mandate from the People in support of his corporatist initiative”, that the Court had
struck down the federal legislation because “[o]n its view, the Democrats assembling on Capitol
Hill in 1933 had not earned the popular authority to displace the tradition of Congressionally
centered government with a corporatist regime based on Presidential leadership,” and that “the
Court put Americans on notice that the New Deal was shaking the foundations – and it was not
too late to withdraw their mandate.”55 Summing up his analysis of the New Deal, Ackerman
claims that ignoring the operation of the higher lawmaking system in that context would not be
“doing justice to the protagonists’ own understanding of the period”.56
Now why does Ackerman make these empirical claims, and why does his entire argument
depend on them? Imagine two different ways in which each of Ackerman’s constitutional
moments may actually have unfolded. In the first scenario, constitutional actors seeking to effect
legal change simply saw themselves as acting outside the law. Their opponents may have
accused them of acting illegally, and may have insisted on the importance of proceeding through
Article V, even if they agreed with the substance of the proposed constitutional change, or may
have been opposed because they disagreed with the proposal on its merits. However, the claims
of legality were not decisive to constitutional reformers, for a number of possible reasons. They
may have been indifferent to legal forms entirely, focussing instead on the substantive legitimacy
of the proposed constitutional changes. Alternatively, they may have taken the claims of formal
legality seriously, but thought they were outweighed by the substantive legitimacy of their
53
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constitutional proposals, which may have been unachievable through strict adherence to
constitutional process. It may be that they were operating within the framework of popular
sovereignty, holding that the people retain the inherent power to set aside the constitutional
structures they had given themselves at the Founding. The attempt to implement constitutional
change outside Article V – essentially a constitutional coup – produced inter-institutional
struggles, if the reformers had gained an institutional beachhead. They may have used
mechanisms available to them under existing constitutional arrangements – in the case of
Congress, impeachment of the President, and changes to the membership, size, and jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court – to exert pressure on dissenting institutions. Mass political mobilization,
through elections, may have played a role in exerting political pressure. The dissenting
institutions may have eventually acquiesced for a range of reasons: because they changed their
minds on the substantive legitimacy of the constitutional reform, because they amended their
views on the importance of formal legality, or because they concluded that the personal and
institutional costs of resistance outweighed any concerns regarding the substance of the proposals
and legal process. And because of their acquiescence, the American constitution changed,
ultimately recognized in the courts – much in the manner that revolutionary constitutions have
been recognized by courts across the world as being legally effective.
The second scenario, of course, is Ackerman’s system of higher lawmaking. To be sure,
these two scenarios have important elements in common. In both, Article V was not complied
with. Moreover, constitutional actors were fully aware of the fact of their non-compliance, and
deliberately chose to proceed without formal constitutional amendment. Notwithstanding the
choice to proceed outside textually recognized channels for constitutional change, the goal of
constitutional actors was not to destroy the American constitutional system and precipitate a
descent into lawlessness. Rather, their goal was to change the constitution in a way that would
have concrete legal consequences in courts of law after such a change had taken place.
Moreover, the externally observable patterns of political behaviour may be identical, as with
much of the political discourse employed by the parties.
However, despite these commonalities, the two scenarios are fundamentally different in
one respect. In the former, political actors believed that their behaviour would have legal effects,
but did not regard themselves as operating within a legally recognized mechanism of
constitutional change, whereas in the latter, they did. This is a critical distinction, because this
kind of attitude toward legally constituted processes is what defines the legal mindset. As Hart
famously explained, legal subjects have an “internal” attitude toward legal norms – what he
termed the “internal point of view”. The internal point of view captures the idea that actors
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within a legal order plan, structure, describe, explain and justify their own actions through the
lens of what they believe the law permits or requires, and interpret, judge and publicly react to the
actions of other actors in light of the law as well. Laws are guides to conduct, reasons for
behaving in certain ways and not behaving in others, standards against which to assess deviations
from the law, and justifications for demands for law-compliant behaviour and criticism for nonconformity. As Hart said in a famous passage, “officials, lawyers, or private persons … use
them, in one situation after another, as guides to the conduct of social life, as the basis for claims,
demands, admissions, criticism, or punishment …”.57 Constitutional actors engaging in a
constitutional moment, accordingly, should understand whether certain conduct is part of a
particular stage in the process of higher lawmaking – for example, “signalling” or an
“unconventional assault” – and frame their responses according to the rules of this legal process.
If constitutional actors during constitutional moments did not regard Ackerman’s rules of
higher lawmaking from an internal point of view, then Ackerman would not be able to
demonstrate they were engaged in a legal procedure, as opposed to an extra-legal process that
would have the effect of, and may have had the purpose of, producing legal change. So not
surprisingly, Ackerman does make this empirical claim, because he has to.58 How does
Ackerman fare? It is in Transformations that Ackerman sets out detailed historical discussion of
each of his constitutional moments.59 It is therefore odd and highly surprising that at the end of
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Transformations, after having presented his historical evidence, Ackerman tries to back away
from his descriptive claim, in his analysis of the transformative opinions of the New Deal. In a
remarkable passage, he states that he wants to move away from “the old and tired debate about
the subjective motivations of the two Justices – Hughes and Roberts – who engineered the switch
by forming a solid bloc with the three so-called liberals, Brandeis, Cardozo, and Stone.
Unsurprisingly, the evidence on this matter is equivocal. But even if Roberts and Hughes had
been apolitical legalists of legendary proportion, I could not care less.…”.60 Since Ackerman
cannot make this argument, this passage signals that something is amiss.
What is wrong, according to leading students of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the
New Deal, is that Ackerman largely fails to make his historical case.61 To be sure, Ackerman
offers ample evidence of awareness among constitutional actors, especially during the Founding
and the Reconstruction, that constitutional change was being achieved illegally (although not all
constitutional actors conceded this point). But this is not enough. Ackerman also needs to
provide evidence that constitutional actors were aware that they were working the gears of an
alternative system of constitutional change.62 Otherwise, all the evidence shows that is that
constitutional actors self-consciously engaged in a legal revolution which they hoped would be
ultimately accepted by constitutional actors as being legally effective (for example, as the
American revolution had).
Consider one set of examples – the judicial acceptance of a non-Article V amendment
through a “consolidating judgment”. Since courts must justify their decisions through reasoned
opinions, we should expect to see an explicit acknowledgment of the higher lawmaking process.
However, the evidence Ackerman offers is very weak. The first case in which the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment was the Slaughterhouse Cases.63 Ackerman rightly
notes that although the Court was divided over the interpretation of the amendment, it was
unanimous in accepting its validity. But this begs the question of the basis upon which the Court
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regarded the Fourteenth Amendment as valid. Ackerman rests his case on a single phrase in the
majority judgment that refers to the Reconstruction amendments – “within the last eight years
three other articles of amendment of vast importance have been added by the voice of the people
to that now venerable instrument”.64 Ackerman claims that the passage is proof of judicial
awareness of higher lawmaking, because the Court “speaks the unmediated language of popular
sovereignty without trying to establish the amendments’ legal pedigree under Article Five”.65
Admittedly, the passage is consistent with that view. However, it is consistent with another view
as well – that Article V had been followed, and that the requisite degree of state and federal
consent, through institutions accountable to the electorate, amounted to the adoption of the
amendments by “the people” (even though such a view may be mistaken). Turning to the
“consolidating” judgments of the New Deal, by Ackerman’s own account, those decisions contain
no language that is capable of being interpreted as judicial acknowledgment of non-Article V
constitutional amendments.66 Indeed, Ackerman argues that the judgments deliberately created
“an impression of substantial doctrinal continuity” which masked the “disequilibrium between
revolutionary holdings and traditional dicta”,67 and were followed up by judgments that did
acknowledge the doctrinal revolution that had taken place.68 But again, those later judgments did
not refer to Ackerman’s higher lawmaking process.
And if we turn to the two cases that Ackerman discusses in which the Court has
addressed the mechanisms of constitutional change directly – Coleman v. Miller69 (on Article V)
and Casey v. Planned Parenthood70 (on overruling precedents in constitutional cases) – he fares
no better. Although Coleman does discuss the coercion of state governments by the
Reconstruction Congress to secure passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, and goes on to state
that “[t]his decision by the political departments of the Government as to the validity of the
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adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment has been accepted”,71 this language may be read in a
number of different ways. The process surrounding the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment
may be simply an example that supports the narrow proposition emerging from the case, which
was raised by the facts – that under Article V “the efficacy of ratifications by state legislatures, in
the light of previous rejection or attempted withdrawal, should be regarded as a political question
… with the ultimate control in the Congress”.72 Or even if Coleman can be read as referring to
constitutional change in contravention of Article V, it does not follow that the judgment endorses
higher lawmaking. The judgment can be read as no different from that of a common law court
that accepts an unconstitutional regime change, for a variety of strategic and pragmatic reasons
that have nothing to do with popular sovereignty or adherence to an alternative process of
constitutional amendment. Casey does not assist Ackerman either. The Casey plurality explains
the New Deal decisions overruling Lochner-era jurisprudence as flowing from a judicial
assessment that the factual premises of laissez-faire constitutionalism were mistaken.73 Higher
lawmaking does not enter into its analysis at all. Oddly enough, Ackerman does not even attempt
to read Casey as endorsing his higher lawmaking system, if only implicitly.
3. Rescuing Ackerman: Reinterpreting Constitutional Moments as Constitutional Failures
So where does this leave us? Although his historical argument for his higher lawmaking
system is unsuccessful, Ackerman’s major contribution is to place illegal moments of regime
change at the centre of constitutional theory, as opposed to bracketing them through a process of
constitutional amnesia and focussing instead on the operation of established constitutional orders
under law. The existence of these moments, and the tension between their very existence and
America’s self-description as an ongoing and continuous constitutional enterprise committed to
constitutional legality has considerable comparative purchase, because the United States is not
alone in attempting to grapple with extra-legal change under the trappings of constitutional
legalism. This phenomenon raises a question that can be asked not just of the United States but
of other jurisdictions as well, which Ackerman does not himself pose. Why did political actors act
outside of normal constitutional processes to effect constitutional change, given the formal
availability of constitutional amendment?

71

307 U.S. 433, 449-450 (1939).

72

307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939).

73

505 U.S. 833, - 861-2 (1992).

21

Those of Ackerman’s critics who accept his argument that American constitutional
history contains important moments of legal discontinuity do not really address the question of
why Article V was not complied with. Ackerman does not fare much better. One of the most
puzzling features of We the People is that Ackerman never provides a sustained explanation of
what factors drove American political institutions to implement dramatic constitutional change
off the Article V track. However, if we re-read Ackerman carefully with this question in mind,
we will see that he has answers, although at times his responses are unclear. The closest
Ackerman comes is when he suggests that during the Reconstruction and the New Deal, America
faced a “crisis” which Article V was an impediment to resolving:
At two of the greatest crises in their history, Americans faced the very grave risk
of a false negative. If they chose to play punctiliously by the rules of Article
Five, Reconstruction Republicans and New Deal Democrats confronted the clear
and present danger that their long and successful struggle to mobilize the People
for fundamental change would be legalistic nit-picking.74
The key to Ackerman’s argument is the existence of a crisis. But to make this argument
successfully, Ackerman needs to offer us a definition of the kind of crisis that America faced, and
why Article V was thought to be incapable of addressing it. Here is what he says about the
Reconstruction:
Without this kind of unconventional creativity, it is hard to see how Americans
could have democratically transformed themselves from a decentralized Union of
white men to a Nation of all races and creeds whose government—on both
federal and state levels—is actively engaged in assuring a better life for all
citizens.75
So Ackerman’s answer may be as follows. Prior to Reconstruction, the people of the United
States defined themselves as a people of white citizens whose membership in the American
political community proceeded through their political status as citizens of the states, and who
expressed their consent to constitutional change through state legislatures. The substantive
constitutional changes wrought by the Reconstruction amendments marked a fundamental
challenge to that very premise. But since the rules of Article V also reflected this original
conception of political community, the disagreement occasioned by the Reconstruction
amendments operated on two levels. There was a substantive constitutional disagreement over
racial equality and the federal government’s power to protect it. Moreover, that substantive
disagreement also led to the breakdown of the rules governing constitutional change, because the
74
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existing rules reflected one of the competing, substantive conceptions of American political
community on the table which the Reconstruction amendments sought to displace.
Understood this way, the crisis of Reconstruction involved a serious and profound
constitutional breakdown, but of a particular sort. A basic ambition of constitutionalism is to
channel political conflict that would otherwise spill into the streets, into institutions that operate
peacefully according to law and which reach decisions which members of a political community
accept as authoritative. In order to function properly, constitutionally-created institutions must
operate according to rules of procedure which specify how institutional decisions are made. And
for institutional decisions to produce political settlement, those institutions and their decisionmaking procedures must be viewed by political actors as standing outside the terrain of politics,
as constituting and regulating political life and not forming part of it, as being indifferent among
the competing political positions on the table. Were this not to be true – that is, were the
mechanisms by which political disagreement is managed themselves subject to ongoing and
constant political contestation in the course of their operation – it would be difficult for
institutional settlement to translate into political settlement. Particular institutional decisions
could always be challenged by shifting the political battlefield to a higher level, and arguing that
the decision was illegitimate because the procedure by which it was arrived at was itself the
proper subject of politics.
The rules for constitutional amendment, and their relationship to constitutional politics,
can be conceptualized in an analogous way. Constitutional drafters may agree that for a variety
of reasons – the possibility of future changes in the factual assumptions underlying constitutional
design, the possibility that the lived experience of constitutionally-created institutions may differ
from their expected performance, the potential for political values and identities to evolve, or an
awareness that questions of institutional design are properly the subject of politics but only on
special occasions – that constitutions should allow for the possibility of amendment. Thus, in
addition to creating the procedural framework for normal politics, constitutions also create the
procedural framework for constitutional politics. And for the rules of constitutional amendment
to operate effectively, they must also be accepted as standing outside the terrain of substantive
constitutional politics, as constituting and regulating constitutional politics and not forming part
of it, and as being indifferent among the competing constitutional positions at play.
Now the problem with this highly simplified picture is that constitutionally created procedures –
both for normal and constitutional politics – are far from substantively neutral themselves.
Rather, as Jeremy Waldron has argued, political procedures reflect competing conceptions of the
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very sorts of values that are the bread-and-butter of both normal and constitutional politics.76 In
particular, by determining which individuals and communities can participate in political
decision-making, and what role those individuals and communities play, decision-rules reflect
controversial judgments about the locus of political sovereignty, by an extension, the very
identity of a political community. So the boundary between substantive political disputes and the
procedural frameworks within which those disputes play out is highly artificial. Liberal
democratic constitutionalism depends, then, on the suspension of political judgment with respect
to institutions and institutional decision-making procedures to purchase the prospect of political
settlement. The entrenchment of decision-making procedures in many constitutions should
accordingly be understood as one strategy for facilitating the suspension of political judgment.
By increasing the transaction costs of changing those procedures, constitutional entrenchment
renders such debates less attractive.
The suspension of political judgment with respect to political procedures will become
most difficult to sustain at those moments when the substantive dispute challenges the very
conception of political community that underlies the decision-making framework within which
that debate occurs. Call these moments of constitutive politics. With respect to the rules of
normal politics, the inability to maintain the boundary between substantive politics and political
procedures will be to shift the terrain of disagreement up one level, from normal politics to
constitutional politics, which in turn is regulated by its own set of procedures, the rules governing
constitutional amendment. But if it becomes impossible to suspend political judgment regarding
the procedures for constitutional amendment – that is, at moments of constitutive constitutional
politics – there is no higher level to which the dispute can be shifted. Even if one designed a
constitution to create a special set of rules to regulate amendments to the rules for constitutional
amendment, the same problem might arise with respect to those rules. It is impossible to continue
this strategy ad infinitum. And in the absence of agreed to procedures for constitutional decisionmaking, institutional settlement cannot yield political settlement. The result may be that the
constitutional system itself may come tumbling down.
As I read Ackerman, he believes that the Reconstruction may have been such a case. I
suspect that Ackerman would tell a similar story about the Founding – i.e., that the Articles of
Confederation reflected a conception of political community that the Federalist Constitution
directly challenged. Ackerman says as much:
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Begin with the basic problem that led the Federalists to their revolutionary break
with the rules. The Federalists were the first, but not the last, to assert that the
pre-existing system gave the states too much power to veto constitutional
initiatives emerging from the center. While it is a mistake to view them as
embracing the more emphatic nationalisms of Reconstruction Republicans or
New Deal Democrats, Federalists were espousing a vision of the Union that was
relatively nationalistic for its time and place—nationalistic enough to make it
impossible to enact through a system that gave so much power to the states.77
It may very well be that two of Ackerman’s constitutional moments are really best understood as
moments of constitutional paralysis and failure, resulting from the inability of rules governing
constitutional amendment to constitute and regulate moments of constitutive constitutional
politics. This is a description that carries quite a different flavour than Ackerman’s favourable
description of constitutional moments as high constitutional politics marked by highly focussed
and public minded mass political deliberation.
D. Do Constitutional Moments Travel? The Secession Reference
1. Constitutional Moments Reinterpreted: A Comparative Example
Ackerman’s constitutional moments, on my reinterpretation, consist of an extra-legal
constitutional change, resorted to as a consequence of the failure of formal rules of constitutional
amendment. Those rules fail in these circumstances because they reflect one of the competing,
substantive constitutional positions that is the subject of constitutional politics. Because they are
enmeshed in the constitutional dispute they purport to regulate, those rules become incapable of
functioning as a framework for constituting constitutional politics; instead, they are drawn into
constitutional politics and become part of it.
I think that this framework for constitutional moments can help us to make sense of one
of what is simultaneously the most controversial, important, and puzzling constitutional episode
in recent Canadian constitutional history -- the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in the
Secession Reference. I will argue that although the Court purported to do otherwise, it amended
the Canadian constitution under the guise of constitutional interpretation. Moreover, since the
relevant rules confer the power of constitutional amendment on political institutions, the Court
acted extra-legally. I will then turn to a discussion of the political circumstances which gave rise
to the posing of the reference questions, as well as the ongoing political controversy surrounding
the Canadian rules governing constitutional amendment. I will demonstrate that the procedures
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for constitutional amendment themselves reflected a substantive conception of the Canadian
political community which the Quebec secession movement sought to challenge, and hence were
drawn into constitutional politics and proved incapable of legally regulating the process of
secession itself, including the adoption of procedures governing secession that would be
acceptable to all parties. The Court’s judgment must therefore be understood against the
backdrop of constitutional failure – as an extra-level move the Court felt was made necessary by
the breakdown of the procedures governing constitutional amendment.
2. The Secession Reference as Extra-Legal Constitutional Change
The Supreme Court of Canada possesses an advisory jurisdiction, and in September,
1996, the federal government posed three questions to the Court that asked it to address aspects of
the legal framework governing the secession of a province from the Canadian federation. The
first of these questions asked if “[u]nder the Constitution of Canada … the National Assembly,
legislature or government of Quebec [could] effect the secession of Quebec from Canada
unilaterally”. To explain how the Court was expected to answer question one, and why its answer
was so surprising, it is important to understand what the question does and does not ask.
Question one asks whether a province can secede from Canada “unilaterally”. Although the
reference questions do not define what unilateral secession is, it was widely understood to mean
the secession of a province without the consent of other Canadian governments. At the very least,
this includes the federal government, but could also connote secession without the consent of the
other provinces, or Quebec’s aboriginal peoples, some of whom are legally ordered into selfgoverning communities.
If one turns to the provisions of the Canadian constitution governing provincial
legislative and executive authority, neither is there a right for provinces to secede, nor can any of
the relevant provisions be interpreted as conferring such a right.78 Moreover, since the Canadian
constitution creates the province of Quebec, defines its territory and borders, creates its legislative
and executive branches, and confers limited areas of jurisdiction on them, the province of Quebec
is a creature of the Canadian constitution, as opposed to a sovereign entity that pre-existed and
survived the creation of the Canadian federation, and which retains inherent sovereignty.79 The
Canadian constitution also creates federal institutions, and confers limited authority on them that
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extends to the entire country, including Quebec.80 Finally, the constitution asserts its supremacy
over the actions of both the federal and provincial governments.81 The secession of Quebec
would accordingly require a number of sweeping constitutional amendments that would authorize
Quebec’s governing institutions to effect the secession of the province and declare statehood, to
transfer areas of existing federal jurisdiction to the province, and to terminate the legal authority
of federal institutions over Quebec.
The debate over the right to unilateral secession therefore quickly turns into a problem of
constitutional amendment. The rules for constitutional amendment in Canada are contained in
Part V of the Constitution Act, 1982, which contains five different “amending formulas” applying
to different categories of amendments.82 All the amending formulas, save for one, absolutely
require the consent of the federal government.83 Only one amending formula permits provinces
to amend the constitution unilaterally.84 This provision applies to “the constitution of a
province”, a term which the constitution does not define, and whose meaning is a matter of some
debate. Its core meaning includes matters internal to a province and its institutions and the
prevailing view is that it would not extend to the structure and powers of federal institutions, and
to the scope of provincial powers (such as a provincial right to secede), changes to both of which
would be required to effect the secession of a province. So the answer to question one is “no” –
under the Constitution of Canada, a province cannot secede unilaterally.
This relatively straight-forward outline for the judgment comes directly from the federal
government’s written and oral submissions, as well as those made by other parties to the case.
Observers accordingly expected the Court to begin its analysis with the constitutional text, and to
grapple with the relevant questions of textual interpretation much as the parties had done so. The
only unpredictable aspect of the judgment was whether it would be relatively narrow or broad – a
narrow judgment limiting itself to ruling on the inapplicability of the provincial unilateral
procedure, a broader judgment addressing which other amending formulas would be engaged by
secession.

80

Id. ss. 3, 4, 9-57, 91, 92(10), 92A(2), 94, 94A, 95, 96-101.

81

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 52, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter
Constitution Act, 1982].
82

Id. ss. 38-47.

83

Id. s. 45.

84

Id.

27

But the judgment was dramatically different. The Court opened by signalling the
importance of “underlying principles,” and stated that it was “not possible to answer the
questions” without considering them.85 The Court identified these principles on the basis of a
lengthy review of the “historical context,”86 which consisted of a selective account of the
constitutional practice of Canadian governments since the founding of Canada in 1867.
According to the Court, four principles characterize “the evolution of our constitutional
arrangements”87: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for
minorities. The Court then applied these principles to develop the constitutional framework for
secession. It set out this framework in the context of a referendum vote that was as “a clear
expression by the people of Quebec of their will to secede from Canada”.88 The Court clarified
that a “clear” result must have two dimensions to it – that it “be free of ambiguity both in terms of
the question asked and in terms of the support it achieves”89 – i.e. with respect to the wording of
the question and the degree of public support required for that question. The Court provided
further detail on both dimensions. The question had to be “a clear question in favour of
secession”.90 The level of support required was “a clear majority of Quebecers”.91 Taken
together, this has come to be known as the requirement for “a clear majority on a clear
question”.92
The Court noted that the Constitution was silent on referenda, and that “a referendum, in
itself and without more, has not direct legal effect, and could not in itself bring about unilateral
secession”.93 But the Court then went to state that a referendum vote that met these criteria
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“would give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate
constitutional changes to respond to that desire”. 94 This is the so-called “duty to negotiate”,
which flows from the four constitutional principles, which the Court deployed to reject “two
absolutist propositions”.95 First, it rejected the view “that there would be a legal obligation on the
other provinces and federal government to accede to the secession of a province, subject only to
the logistical details of secession”,96 i.e., that “Quebec could … invoke a right of selfdetermination such as to dictate the terms of proposed secession to the other parties.”97 But it
also rejected “the reverse proposition, that a clear expression of self-determination by the people
of Quebec would impose no obligations upon the other provinces or the federal government.”98
The Court rejected these propositions because each was based on one constitutional principle to
the exclusion of the others. Thus, the first view (which had been advocated by some Quebec
sovereignists) was mistaken because it invoked “[t]he democracy principle … to trump the
principles of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the
operation of democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.”99 The second view –
which the Court did not attribute, but which had been advanced by hard-line federalists – “fails to
give sufficient weight to underlying constitutional principles that must inform the amending
process, including the principles of democracy and federalism”.100 Thus, “once it is realized that
none of the rights or principles under discussion is absolute to the exclusion of the others”, the
Court arrived at the conclusion that “other parties cannot exercise their rights in such a way as to
amount to an absolute denial of Quebec’s rights, and similarly, that so long as Quebec exercises
its rights while respecting the rights of others, it may propose secession and seek to achieve it
through negotiation”.101
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In addition to specifying that the vote of a clear majority on a clear question would
trigger negotiations, the Court also addressed who the participants in such negotiations would be,
and how negotiations must be conducted. The Court offers numerous statements on the parties,
involving Quebec and shifting combinations of other parties – the federal government, the
provinces, and other participants.102 The Court said that the negotiations must be conducted “in
accordance with the underlying constitutional principles already discussed”,103 which seems to
have two implications. First, it mandates that negotiators must take into account the four
constitutional principles.104 This kind of duty is procedural, and would require the negotiators to
take these constitutional principles seriously, such that negotiations would be “principled”,105 but
would impose no constraints on the outcome of the negotiations. Second, the Court also seemed
to suggest that the constitutional principles impose substantive restraints on the terms of whatever
agreement is negotiated, when it said that “[t]he negotiation process … would require the
reconciliation of various rights and obligations”.106
The judgment was enormously surprising. It bore no relationship to the submissions of
the parties and intervenors. The questions of the judges in the oral hearing offered no clue as to
the unexpected direction of the Court’s judgment. Now to be sure, the Court was not bound to
frame its judgment within the framework suggested by the parties, if it concluded that that
framework was somehow mistaken or deficient in legal terms. But the judgment was surprising
for another reason – because it departed from the standard manner in which Canadian courts
approach questions of constitutional interpretation. In Canadian constitutional practice, the
starting point of constitutional interpretation is the text of the Constitution. This is not to say that
102
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principles of substantive political morality – such as the constitutional principles identified and
applied by the Court – do not play a role in constitutional argumentation. As Fred Schauer has
persuasively argued, some constitutional provisions appear to incorporate principles of political
morality "by reference," and therefore invite (but do not compel) courts to engage in the type of
normative reasoning characteristic of moral and political philosophy.107 This is true of many, if
not most of the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,108 which has
generated a jurisprudence in which abstract questions of political principle occupy centre-stage.
But not all constitutional provisions are worded in this way. Setting to one side the inherent
limitations of legal language to address factual situations that were unanticipated when that
language was framed (the problem of open-texturedness), some provisions are relatively specific
and precise, and have interpretive frames narrow enough to create a strong presumption against
the recourse to normative reasoning. In the end, constitutional text plays a primary role in
signalling interpretive style.109
Indeed, the Court in the Secession Reference itself offered this account of the relationship
of the constitutional text and the “underlying principles” of the Canadian constitution, suggesting
that this account reflected its own approach to constitutional interpretation. The Court suggested
that the “principles inform and sustain the constitutional text: they are the vital unstated
assumptions upon which the text is based”.110 The idea appears to be that the specific provisions
of the constitutional text implement or actualize underlying principles which are abstract and
general in nature. This view is supported by the Court’s statement that “[t]he principles dictate
major elements of the architecture of the Constitution itself”.111 Moreover, this conception of the
relationship between principles and text suggests that the former could be used to interpret the
latter, and to reconcile divergent or conflicting constitutional provisions, which the Court said as
well.112 But the Court cautioned that the recognition of underlying principles “could not be taken
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as an invitation to dispense with the written text of the Constitution”.113 In other words, the text
delimits constitutional interpretation, and principles on their own have no binding legal force.
So the question is whether we can make sense of the judgment’s reliance on unwritten
constitutional principles as the application of constitutional principles to the construction of a
constitutional text which permits or invites such an interpretive approach. Recall the Court’s
central holding – that notwithstanding any constitutional provisions on referenda or secession, a
vote by a clear majority of Quebecers in favour of a clear question on secession would trigger a
duty to negotiate, that negotiating parties would have to take into account the four constitutional
principles in attempting to negotiate secession, and that the resulting agreement would have to
reconcile the four constitutional principles. I refer to this constitutional framework as the
“secession clause”. Now unlike other federal constitutions,114 the Canadian constitution lacks an
express secession clause – it contains no provision regulating secession, either prohibiting it or
permitting it under certain circumstances. To locate a textual hook for the Court’s judgment, we
must look to elsewhere. Since the Court itself stated that secession could be achieved through
constitutional amendment,115 we should examine Part V. But when we read these constitutional
provisions, it is difficult to find any basis for the Court’s interpretive moves. Consider, for
example, the rule that the vote of clear majority in favour of a clear question on secession in a
referendum would trigger negotiations. Under Part V, the initiating process for constitutional
amendment is the passage of a resolution by a provincial legislative assembly or Parliament.116 A
referendum in itself is of no constitutional significance in commencing the amendment process.
To be sure, provinces and the federal government may opt to rely on referenda as part of the
process of constitutional amendment. Some provinces have enacted legislation prohibiting the
tabling of resolutions for constitutional amendments before legislative assemblies without prior
approval of those amendments in a province-wide referendum.117 But a political choice to weave
referenda into the amendment process, and legislation pre-committing future governments to hold
referenda for constitutional amendments, are altogether different from reading referenda into Part
V as an alternative constitutional mechanism for initiating the process of constitutional revision.
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Not surprisingly, the weak connection between the constitutional principles and the
constitutional text was acknowledged by the Court itself, for in addition to its account of
constitutional principles as interpretive aids, the Court offered an alternative account of the role
they play in constitutional interpretation. Thus, it stated that principles themselves “in certain
circumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations … which constitute substantive
limitations upon government action”; these obligations could be either “very abstract or general”
or “more specific and precise” – like a constitutional text. And the Court quoted, with approval,
from an earlier judgment in which the Court had stated that in the course of constitutional
adjudication, it could fill “gaps in the express terms of the constitutional text".118 Thus, principles
could be used not merely to interpret the constitutional text, but also to supplement it. The
question then arises of when the Court would do this. The idea of gap-filling appears to be
supported by a statement earlier in the Court’s reasoning, where it posited that problems might
arise “which are not expressly dealt with by the text of the Constitution” and that “[i]n order to
endure over time, a constitution must contain a comprehensive set of rules and principles which
are capable of providing an exhaustive legal framework for our system of government”.119
So if there is any doubt as to whether the Court approached the task of constitutional
interpretation rather differently from its normal practice in the Secession Reference, the Court’s
own depiction of its interpretive methodology – i.e. the filling of gaps in the constitutional text
through the use of constitutional principles, as opposed to the use of those principles when invited
by textual cues, to interpret constitutional provisions – should put an end to these reservations.
And it is equally clear that the Court relied on this conception of the role of underlying principles
in constitutional adjudication, because the Court added new rules governing secession that were
not present in the text but which were rather specific. What must be acknowledged – and what
the Court came very close to saying itself – is that the Court wrote a secession clause into the
Canadian constitution through the use of unwritten constitutional principles.
However, the major problem with “gap-filling” through judicial interpretation is that the
Canadian constitution itself sets up a process for filling constitutional gaps, whether perceived or
actual – the process of constitutional amendment in Part V. The relevant actors in Part V are
provincial legislative assemblies, the Senate, the House of Commons, the Governor General,
Parliament, and provincial legislatures. Notably absent from this lengthy list of constitutional
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actors are courts, which are granted no formal role at any stage of constitutional amendment.
Now to be sure, the courts may be called upon to interpret Part V, but that kind of role is far from
the power to initiate, let alone make, a constitutional amendment. The challenge which Part V
poses to the Court in the Secession Reference is why it did not permit the political actors to effect
an amendment to the Constitution, and instead engaged in amendment-like interpretation itself.
In making an analytical distinction between constitutional interpretation and
constitutional amendment, each a distinct constitutional process involving a different set of
institutional actors under the Canadian constitutional system, I do not mean to deny an important
role for constitutional interpretation as a mechanism of constitutional change. That would be a
serious mistake, since Canadian courts have been an important source of constitutional adaptation
over time that has enabled the Canadian constitution to keep track with massive economic, social
and political change without formal amendment,120 much like courts in the United States.121
Moreover, formal constitutional amendments – both successful and unsuccessful – have been
framed as direct responses to judicial interpretations of the constitution,122 which illustrates that
the two can operate as functional equivalents, and that the space between amendment and
interpretation can be very small indeed.
However, to accept that courts have served as important engines of constitutional change
and adaptation should not obscure the fact that constitutional interpretation functions within
important limits that inhere in the very nature of the judicial process. The most significant of
these is the incremental nature of legal change which occurs according to the common law
method of constitutional interpretation. Although changes may accrete over time through the
development of constitutional doctrine, and cumulatively move the meaning of constitutional
provisions a significant extent away from its origins, these changes are nonetheless different in
degree from the kind of sweeping constitutional revision possible by formal constitutional
amendment. The change to the Canadian constitution worked by the Secession Reference was
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enough of a departure from the existing constitutional position to be much more like a formal
constitutional amendment than a narrow court judgment. And so the question remains – why did
the Court assert and exercise a power of constitutional amendment that the Canadian constitution
expressly vests in a set of institutions that does not include the courts? Why did the Court engage
in extra-legal constitutional change, one of the defining features of Ackerman’s constitutional
moments?
3. The Constitutional Failure of the Canadian Amending Formulas
The Supreme Court of Canada behaved the way it did because of the failure of the
processes of constitutional amendment spelled out in the Canadian constitution. This explanation
is analogous to how during the Reconstruction, the rules in Article V were unable to regulate
constitutional politics, because they reflected a conception of the American political community
which was itself challenged by the Reconstruction amendments, and hence were unable to
regulate constitutional change. I argue that a parallel dynamic took place in Canada in the mid1990’s. An important preoccupation of Canadian constitutional politics has been the process of
constitutional amendment itself, driven by awareness that rules regarding constitutional
amendment reflect the ultimate locus of political sovereignty, and accordingly mirror a
conception of what Canada is. In the context of Quebec’s secession from Canada, the applicable
rules of constitutional amendment embodied the very conception of Canada that Quebec
secessionists sought to challenge. For that reason, they failed in performing their basic function
of standing outside of constitutional politics and regulating and constituting that potential
constitutional change, and were drawn into it.
An important theme in Canadian constitutional history has been the search for an
amending procedure in which some combination of Canadian political actors would hold the
power to amend the Canadian constitution. This search was driven by the absence of a procedure
for constitutional amendment in the Constitution Act, 1867,123 the constitutional document which
created the Canadian federation. Because the 1867 Constitution is an ordinary British statute, the
power of amendment, by default, rested with the Imperial Parliament, which made twenty-two
amendments over more than a century.124 Accordingly, the development of an amending
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procedure necessarily entitled bringing the Canadian constitution “home” from Britain – a project
of constitutional “patriation”, a term popularized by Pierre Trudeau.125
For as long as the formal practical power of constitutional amendment rested outside of
Canada, Canadian sovereignty was regarded as being incomplete. Until the end of the First
World War, this did not pose any great problem, as Canada understood itself as possessing
internal powers of self-government, with international relations handled by Britain. However, as
Canada attained independence, the lack of a domestic amending formula became a constitutional
anomaly. What thrust the issue onto Canada’s political agenda was the Balfour Declaration of
1926, which formally recognized Canada’s statehood.126 The end of Canada’s colonial status
required that Canadian governments come to some agreement on the shape of a domestic
amending procedure. However, an agreement did not occur until 1981 – and even then, was not
unanimous.127
Because of the curious constitutional dynamic created by Canada’s incomplete
constitution and its gradual evolution to statehood, Canadian constitutional politics were driven
by the search for a domestic amending formula for over fifty years, as much as they were by
proposals for substantive changes to Canada’s federal structure. This proved to be an enormously
difficult task. In order to shift ultimate sovereignty back to Canada, Canadian political actors had
to agree where the locus of sovereignty should lie, or more accurately, who the constituent actors
in a domestic amending procedure should be – the federal government, provincial governments,
the national population, or various provincial populations. Answering this question, in turn,
required political actors to grapple with the basic question of what the terms of political
association in Canada were – that is, the very nature of the Canadian political community. But on
that basic question, there was a lack of consensus. The constitutional politics of constitutional
amendment accordingly took place on two levels. On the one hand, it was intimately concerned
with practical questions of constitutional design, focusing on the consequences of alternative
options. On the other hand, it was a symbolic politics, a terrain for a struggle over the meaning of
the country. Canada’s failure to secure agreement on a procedure to amend its constitutional
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amendment can therefore be understood, as Peter Russell has argued, as the consequence of
conflicting national narratives that illustrated how Canadians had not yet constituted themselves
as a sovereign people.128
The inextricable link between the constitutional politics of process and substantive
constitutional politics serves as backdrop though which to understand the failure of Part V to
regulate constitutional politics of secession in the mid 1990’s. Quebec was a central player in the
constitutional politics of constitutional amendment from 1927 to the early 1990’s, and throughout
pushed for a constitutional veto, informed by a vision of the Canadian political community and its
place in it. But as Peter Oliver has explained, Quebec’s self-understanding changed over time. 129
Initially, Quebec invoked the “compact theory” of Confederation, which imagined the Canadian
constitution as a contract or treaty among the original federating colonies. Accordingly, the
Canadian constitution could only be changed with the consent of the parties, which translated into
provincial vetoes on constitutional amendment for every province including Quebec. The scope
of provincial vetoes extended beyond the federal-provincial division of powers to the shape and
structure of federal institutions, which were designed to protect important provincial interests.
Quebec eventually shifted away from the compact theory, for two reasons. Although other
provinces initially supported Quebec in advancing the compact theory, beginning in 1950, they
became willing to adopt procedures for constitutional amendment that would permit
constitutional change without unanimous provincial consent. Second, the requirement for
provincial unanimity built into the compact theory threatened to thwart Quebec’s evolving
constitutional agenda, which changed shape in the 1960’s from defending its constitutional
position against erosion to expanding its areas of jurisdiction,. Quebec responded by formulating
the “two nations” theory of Canadian federalism, which views Canada as a contract or treaty
between two founding peoples, English and French, whose consent was required for
constitutional changes. Quebec was the sole representative of French Canadians, which granted it
a veto. By contrast, since the other provinces collectively spoke for English Canadians, no other
province possessed a veto.
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It is against this background that one has to read the events of 1981 surrounding the
adoption of the amending formulas. The current amending procedures spelled out in Part V were
adopted as part of a package of constitutional amendments agreed to by the federal government
and the nine provinces other than Quebec. Prior to this agreement, Quebec had indicated its
willingness to abandon its claim for a constitutional veto in exchange for the right to opt out of
any future constitutional amendments transferring provincial powers to the federal government
with full financial compensation. Quebec rejected the 1981 amendments, because it contained
only a narrow right of compensation for educational and cultural matters. But the debate quickly
turned to process. Although as a legal matter, the power of amendment rested with the Imperial
Parliament, a pair of constitutional conventions had developed, in the absence of a domestic
amending formula, to condition the exercise of this formal legal power.130 First, constitutional
amendments would only be made by the Imperial Parliament upon the request of the federal
government. Second, the federal government would not transmit requests to Britain to amend the
Canadian constitution without a “substantial” degree of provincial consent. Quebec argued that
the convention of a substantial degree of provincial consent actually required unanimous
provincial consent, on the basis of the compact theory, and that there was an additional
constitutional convention granting Quebec a veto, because of the two nations theory of Canada.131
Quebec first made these arguments directly to the federal government, which rejected
them, and after that to the British government, which declined to intervene. Faced with its failure
in politics, Quebec turned to the courts, which rejected the existence of these conventions.
Quebec’s official response was bitter. It refused to concede any ground on the substantive visions
of Canada it had advanced in framing its objections to the substance of the 1982 amendments.
And furthermore, because the process whereby the 1982 constitutional amendments was
described by Quebec as a breach of the existing constitutional norms governing constitutional
amendment, it viewed both the federal government’s conduct and the Court’s judgment as
unconstitutional, setting the stage for later arguments by Quebec that it was not bound by the
rules governing constitutional change spelled out in Part V.
The historical background to the adoption of the procedures for constitutional amendment
illustrates how they were perceived in Quebec as being far from neutral. Rather, they were
viewed as having been adopted in contravention of existing constitutional norms which reflected
Quebec’s proper constitutional status, and as reflecting and entrenching a substantive vision of
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Canada which was incompatible with Quebec’s sense of itself in the Canadian federation. As a
direct consequence the suspension of political judgment necessary for decisions made under the
rules for constitutional amendment in Canada to produce political settlement was no longer
possible. Part V had become part of constitutional politics and would not be able to perform its
regulative function to constrain and channel constitutional politics in those instances where its
decision-rules were perceived as openly favouring one side in constitutional debate. To be sure,
this would not necessarily be true of each and every constitutional amendment, because not every
question of constitutional politics raised existential issues that go to the very nature of the
political community. However, in those cases which did, one would expect important political
actors openly putting Part V to one side.
This is precisely what happened during the constitutional politics of secession, from 1994
to 1998. The substantive question was whether Quebec should remain part of Canada, or become
an independent state, potentially re-associated with Canada in an economic and political
partnership based on sovereign equality. However, equally important was the process whereby
Quebec intended to determine its constitutional status. Quebec had enacted referendum
legislation which clearly contemplated that referenda are strictly consultative, and non-binding.132
A positive referendum vote in favour of sovereignty would not purport to effect a change in
Quebec’s constitutional status. However, the referendum question asked Quebecers whether
“Quebec should become sovereign, after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new
economic and political Partnership, within the scope of the Bill respecting the future of
Quebec…?”133 The Bill referred to is Bill 1, An Act respecting the future of Quebec.134 Bill 1
was introduced in the Quebec National Assembly in September 1995. The key provision is
section 1, which would have authorized the National Assembly “to proclaim the sovereignty of
Quebec”. Given that federalism is a system of dual sovereignty, a declaration of sovereignty may
have been nothing more than an assertion of Quebec’s existing powers under the Canadian
constitution. But section 2 clarified that upon the proclamation of sovereignty, “Quebec shall
become a sovereign country”, and set out the well-established incidents of sovereignty as
belonging to an independent Quebec – “the exclusive power to pass all its laws, levy all its taxes
and conclude all its treaties.” The text of the declaration of sovereignty was set out in the
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preamble, and concluded with the words “Québec is a sovereign country”. Sovereignty meant
Quebec’s departure from the Canadian federation.
Although Bill 1 did not give any juridical effect to a referendum vote, the political
implication was that a positive vote would set in train a process that would lead to a unilateral
declaration of independence by Quebec within a year. Bill 1 made no pretence to proceeding
through Part V, and contemplated instead that Quebec would become independent outside the
existing constitutional framework, through a legal revolution. The constitutional implications of
Bill 1 became very clear in a constitutional challenge launched in the Quebec Superior Court
slightly before the Quebec referendum to the precursor to Bill 1, the Draft Bill on Sovereignty,135
on the basis that it would attempt to achieve the secession of Quebec from Canada without
relying on the procedures for constitutional amendment. Quebec filed a motion to dismiss which
responded directly to this constitutional argument, by asserting that “the will of people is the
foundation of the authority of public power”.136 The constitutional theory at work here is the one
I described earlier, which holds that the rule of recognition of a constitutional order is a
sociological fact which is neither valid nor invalid, but instead, simply exists, regardless of how
this basic political fact arose -- through legal mechanisms, or a violent or velvet revolution.
Accordingly, the Quebec government, and many of the Quebec elite – including federalists
committed to Quebec remaining within Canada – viewed Quebec’s accession to independence,
and the termination of the sovereignty of the Canadian state over Quebec, as originating from the
democratic will of Quebecers as expressed in a referendum vote in favour of independence,
followed by a declaration of sovereignty – an expression of political will that would operate to
change the locus of sovereignty, and to which the law would have to adapt.
The Quebec Superior Court denied the motion to dismiss the constitutional challenge,
stating that “[t]he menace that the government of Quebec would pose to the political institutions
of the Canadian federation is a serious question, which is by its nature justiciable with respect to
the Constitution of Canada”.137 In response Quebec took the unprecedented step of withdrawing
from the proceedings.138 The message sent by Quebec was direct and clear – it refused to accept
the authority of the Canadian courts and the Canadian constitution over Quebec’s potential
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independence. The court ultimately ruled that the actions undertaken by the Quebec government,
and the procedure describe in the Bill, would lead Quebec to issue a universal declaration of
independence (UDI) without first securing a constitutional amendment, and “would result in a
break in continuity in the legal order, which is manifestly contrary to the Constitution of
Canada”.139 The Attorney General of Quebec stated in a press conference in response to the
court’s ruling that a UDI would not and need not conform with the Canadian constitution,
because “the effect of a yes vote would be a rupture with the Canadian constitution … Quebec
will have become a nation”.140
Quebec did not expressly state why it refused to work within the framework of Part V.
But the answer becomes clear if we identify the substantive conception of Canada that Part V
embodies, and Quebec’s place in it. Part V imagines Quebec as a constituent component of the
Canadian federation, as a sub-national political community with extensive but limited rights of
self-government within Canada. It is a constitutionally recognized actor in the process of
constitutional amendment with the power to consent to constitutional amendments, but whose
consent is not absolutely required in all circumstances. This vision was at odds with both the two
nations and compact theories of Canada, which both granted Quebec a veto over constitutional
change.
Moreover, after 1982, in Quebec, the right to self-determination became a corollary of a
constitutional veto over modifications to the Canadian federation, including the right for Quebec
to freely determine its political and legal status. Although the right to secede does not necessarily
follow from the right to veto, in the wake of Quebec’s objections to the process surrounding the
adoption of the 1982 constitutional amendments, it was understood by many of Quebec’s elite in
this way. The right to veto had been grounded in a theory of the Canadian federation that
recognized Quebec as a founding partner, and a breach of those original understandings was
thought to be so fundamental that it allowed Quebec to treat those arrangements as a nullity and
to exit the constitutional order if it chose to. As a consequence, Part V was not perceived as
providing a neutral framework within which Quebecers could engage in collective political
choice over their future political status, because it reflected a Quebec constituted by, embedded in
and restrained by the Canadian constitutional order. Not surprisingly, Part V was drawn into
substantive constitutional politics.
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The constitutional failure of Part V becomes even clearer if we examine the federal
stance on the applicability of the amending provisions to the secession of Quebec during the 1995
referendum. From the outset of the campaign, the federal government deliberately chose to focus
on the substantive question of whether Quebec should remain within Canada, and not on the
procedural issue of how secession would occur. It absolutely refused to launch and to be drawn
into debates regarding the constitutional framework governing the secession of a province from
the Canadian federation. Thus, the federal government made a conscious decision to not
constitutionally question the Draft Bill on Sovereignty, which authorized the National Assembly
to issue a unilateral declaration of independence in clear contravention of Part V. Moreover,
when presented with public requests by individuals and groups in Quebec that it refer the Draft
Bill to the Supreme Court of Canada for its constitutional opinion, it refused. Once constitutional
litigation had been launched, the federal government chose to not intervene in the pre-referendum
litigation, notwithstanding that the case raised basic questions regarding the survival of the
Canadian constitutional order.
The decision to not raise constitutional issues, either in the courts or through public
debate, was a political judgment by the federal government that the political costs of doing so
outweighed the possible benefits. One concern was that by spelling out the procedure for
secession under Part V, the federal government would make secession more likely to happen.
But another reason was the fear that any discussion of legal issues would be interpreted as a threat
to use the constitution to stand in the way of Quebecers’ right to self-determination, and would be
seen as an attempt to intimidate Quebecers. 141 Moreover, it was understood that the fact that the
law in question was Part V would make matters even worse. Quebec elites persistently invoked
the history of the 1982 constitutional amendments, focusing both on the process surrounding their
adoption, as well as the substance of their terms.142 An additional layer of complexity was added
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by Prime Minister Chrétien’s close personal and political link with the 1982 constitutional
process. Chrétien was the federal minister of justice under Pierre Trudeau during the early
1980’s, and was pivotal in negotiating the constitutional agreement among the federal
government and nine provinces, including Part V, which Quebec rejected.143
In addition, it is arguable that federal political actors did not raise the constitutional issue
because they may have even concluded that legal processes, including Part V, could not restrain
and regulate the constitutional politics of secession in the event of an attempt by Quebec to
secede unilaterally. In a widely discussed and unscripted set of remarks shortly after the release
of the text of the Draft Bill on Sovereignty, the federal Minister of Justice acknowledged
“[c]learly, there exists no provision in Canada's constitution” for Quebec to unilaterally secede
from Canada, but went on to say:
But I wonder whether that’s the real question now … Is everyone interested in
these technical details? … To my mind, it’s not constitutional [for a province to
secede unilaterally] … But that’s a technical question. The real question is for
Quebecers, in a referendum. … It’s possible to have a debate on the
constitutionality of (Parizeau's) draft legislation - a very interesting (debate) for
lawyers - but what matters more is the will of Quebecers.144
Although Rock was publicly corrected by the Prime Minister,145 the fact that the federal Minister
of Justice would voice such a view suggests that within some quarters of the federal government,
there was very early on an understanding that Part V would operate in the secession context. A
similar incident took place shortly before the hearing, when the federal Minister of Justice stated
in a newspaper interview that “the existing constitutional framework” might not apply in the
event of a yes vote.146 This position flatly contradicted the federal argument. During the hearing,
the Court asked the federal government’s lawyers to explain this comment. Chief counsel
actually at first suggested that in the event of the unworkability of secession under Part V, “the
Government of Canada would not stand in the way of a clear expression by the majority of
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Quebecers, a clear expression of its wish to secede from Canada”147 – suggesting that Part V
could be put to one side.
Finally, the desire not to refer to Part V by name continues in the judgment of the Court
itself. Before setting out the secession clause, the Court accepted that secession could be
achieved through constitutional amendment.148 But this did not address the constitutionality of
unilateral secession by Quebec. There were two possible ways for the Court to address this issue,
which both required the Court to grapple with Part V. One way to justify this conclusion would
have been to specify which amendments would be required, to consider the relevant amending
formulas, and to determine whether any of these required the consent of the federal government.
However, the Court did not follow this route. Beyond stating that the amendments required
“could be radical and extensive”149 the Court did not suggest what specific amendments would be
required. The other avenue open to the Court would have been to look at the one amending
formula that allows unilateral constitutional amendment by a province, and to ask whether the
internal limits of that provision rendered it inapplicable to secession. However, the Court failed
to avert to the mere existence of the provincial unanimity formula, let alone attempt to interpret
its scope to rule out the constitutionality of unilateral secession.
Indeed, aside from failing to enumerate and interpret the provisions of Part V, the
judgment does not even refer to the existence of Part V. This may have been a political judgment
on its part, reflecting the perceived illegitimacy of Part V in Quebec. Had the Court framed its
analysis of the constitutionality of unilateral secession around Part V, it could have deepened and
prolonged the country’s constitutional crisis, because a principal political actor – the government
of Quebec – would likely have refused to comply with it. By exposing Part V to political
criticism by Quebec, it might have further damaged it, by drawing it into the very centre of
constitutional politics. And unsurprisingly, the Court held that unilateral secession would be
unconstitutional, not because it would contravene Part V, but because it would contravene
constitutional principles – it would invoke “[t]he democracy principle … to trump the principles
of federalism and the rule of law, the rights of individuals and minorities, or the operation of
democracy in the other provinces or in Canada as a whole.”150
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For the judgment to count as a component of a constitutional moment, we must link the
failure of Part V to the Court’s move to change the Canadian constitution through extra-legal
means – explaining the latter as a function of the former. Part V was not only incapable of
constituting the constitutional politics of secession in its current form, and governing the process
of Quebec’s departure from Canada. It was also incapable of being deployed by political actors
to enact amendments to the Canadian constitution that would have added procedures designed to
channel secessionist impulses into a process more likely to be followed by the relevant parties in
the event of a future sovereignty referendum than the existing constitutional framework.
It is not hard to understand why. A round of constitutional politics focusing on the
constitutional regulation of the process of secession, much like constitutional negotiations
focused on the actual secession of Quebec itself, would have raised existential questions
regarding the basic terms of political association of the Canadian political community. Although
Canada has never had such a round of constitutional politics, any of the plausible alternatives that
parties would have raised would themselves have reflected an understanding of the very nature of
the Canadian federation. For example, a constitutional ban on secession arguably reflects a
political theory which holds that the entire territory of country belongs to all of its citizens
equally, and therefore, that those citizens occupying a particular portion of the national territory
would be violating the rights of fellow citizens through unilateral secession. Conversely, a
constitutional right to secede could be premised on exactly the opposite view – for example, and
Daniel Philpott has written, that since membership in a political community is voluntary, it must
also include the right to withdraw from an existing political community and to construct a new
one, and that for this right to be meaningful, it must encompass the right to a territory over which
to exercise political control.151 Alternatively, a right to secede grounded in a theory of Canada as
a multinational federation, with its constituent communities retaining the right to withdraw from
the federal pact – would also reflect a concept of the Canadian political community.152 In short,
parallel to how the rules governing constitutional change reflect a vision of the ultimate locus of
political sovereignty in a political community, so do the rules governing constitutional exit. And
so a debate over what rules to adopt governing secession would also have drawn into question
Part V, which reflected one of the substantive conceptions on the table, rendering it incapable of
providing a framework within which such a constitutional change could be debated.
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E. Moving Forward: Constitutional Moments in Comparative Perspective
At the outset, I suggested that the reinterpretation of constitutional moments as extralegal responses to constitutional failure, serves a number of intellectual projects. It assists us in
better understanding what is at the core of Ackerman’s account of extra-legal changes to the
American constitutional order. It defines the comparative constitutional research agenda of
identifying and better understanding similar episodes of extra-legal change in other legal systems.
It brings the two halves of Ackerman’s constitutional scholarship together, potentially yielding
further dividends for the understanding of American constitutional development through
comparative constitutional scholarship. Finally, it extends Ackerman’s work on constitutional
design to encompass rules for constitutional amendment, and suggests that they may have limited
ability to constrain constitutional politics that concerns constitutive questions going to the very
identity of a political community. By way of conclusion, I address each of these points in turn.
Ackerman reframes constitutional theory around the following problem: America’s
constitutional development contains many examples of fundamental, dramatic constitutional
change that appear to have occurred outside the textually-prescribed procedures for constitutional
amendment. Constitutional theory must therefore come to terms with illegal constitutional
change – why and how it has occurred, and what challenges, if any, it poses for the legitimacy of
the contemporary American constitutional order. Although his descriptive account of higher
lawmaking is unsuccessful, Ackerman deserves credit for posing the right question.
Moreover, a careful analysis of Ackerman’s account of the Reconstruction and the
Founding suggests that he believes that constitutional moments are actually instances of
constitutional failure, marked by the inability of the formal rules of constitutional amendment to
provide a procedural framework for constitutional change at moments of constitutive
constitutional politics. For the rules of constitutional amendment to operate effectively, they
must also be accepted as standing outside the terrain of substantive constitutional politics, as
constituting and regulating constitutional politics and not forming part of it. However, rules of
constitutional amendment are not substantively neutral, since determining which individuals and
communities can participate in constitutional change reflects controversial judgments about the
locus of political sovereignty. Constitutional politics accordingly depends on the suspension of
political judgment toward the rules of constitutional amendment. However, that suspension of
judgment will become most difficult to sustain at those moments when the substantive dispute
challenges the very conception of political community that underlies the rules for constitutional
amendment. At those moments of constitutive constitutional politics, decisions made under the
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rules of constitutional amendment cannot produce political settlement, and the constitutional
system may come tumbling down.
Properly reinterpreted, constitutional moments are in reality moments of constitutional
failure and paralysis. Moreover, they do travel, and shed considerable light on comparable
developments in other constitutional systems. The decision of the Supreme Court in the
Secession Reference is best understood as part of a constitutional moment – an extra-legal move
to amend the Canadian constitution to add a secession clause, prompted by the failure of the rules
for constitutional amendment under the Canadian constitution. Those rules failed because they
reflected a conception of the Canadian political community which the Quebec sovereignty
movement challenged, treating Quebec as one province among many and granting a veto to the
federal government. Indeed, much of the history of Canadian constitutional politics has turned on
the search for an acceptable formula for constitutional amendment, and has been hotly contested
precisely because it was understood that the resulting rules would reflect a conception of Canada.
Instead of providing a stable and uncontested framework for constitutional politics, those rules
were drawn into constitutional politics, and were unable to perform their basic function. This
deep and profound constitutional failure offers a new explanation for the Court’s otherwise
puzzling move to amend the Canadian constitution extra-legally to add procedures for secession
under the guise of constitutional interpretation – a move it made because the formal rules for
constitutional change could not yield such a change.
The comparative constitutional research agenda should be to use the re-interpreted
concept of the constitutional moment to study dramatic constitutional changes in other
jurisdictions. Scholars of comparative constitutionalism must identify moments of constitutional
change that appear to have occurred outside normal constitutional processes for constitutional
amendment, and to determine whether those episodes are best understood as moments of
constitutive constitutional politics which the rules governing constitutional amendment were
unable to regulate. A promising source of examples might be the process of decolonization of
former British colonies. Those colonies were usually granted independence through acts of the
British Parliament which created their post-independence constitution, but were often followed by
“paper” constitutional coups which involved the adoption of a new constitution by domestic
political institutions without the involvement of the British Parliament and in contravention of the
post-independence constitution.153
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The reason for these unconstitutional acts of constitution-making may have been the view
that the status of post-independence constitutions as Imperial statutes depicted the colony as
exercising delegated powers from Britain. On the theory of the British constitution, these
delegated powers could theoretically be withdrawn because Parliament retained ultimate
sovereignty which it could not surrender. The theoretical possibility of Imperial repeal, in other
words, was in effect a rule governing constitutional amendment, which embodied an image of
political community that was fundamentally at odds with the existence of independent, selfdetermining national political entity. As a consequence, post-independence constitutions could
therefore not serve as a legitimate basis for regulating constitutional change, and political actors
in newly independent states discarded them. The goal was to establish an “autochthonous”
source of constitutional title through an extra-legal act that is best understood as a moment of
constitutive constitutional politics.
Comparative investigation also could potentially yield dividends for the understanding of
American constitutional development. The Canadian constitutional example clearly illustrates
how the rules of constitutional amendment were a central part of the history of Canadian
constitutional politics. The comparative research question for American constitutional scholars is
to focus more squarely and intensely on why political actors opted to proceed outside formal rules
for constitutional amendment. In light of the Canadian example, the materials surrounding the
gaming of Article V during the Reconstruction and the Articles of Confederation during the
Founding may pay revisiting with this comparatively oriented question in mind.
Finally, the re-interpretation of constitutional moments as constitutional failures at
moments of constitutive constitutional politics furthers Ackerman’s agenda for constitutional
design, but in a way he may not have appreciated. Rules governing constitutional amendment are
an indispensable aspect of constitutional design. They are an important device for ensuring the
relevance, and hence both the legitimacy and stability of a constitutional order, so much so that
the failure of a constitution to include them, or to make them too demanding to deploy, would be
a fundamental constitutional defect that could pose a threat to the survival of a constitutional
system.
But there is an important lesson to be drawn from the comparative study of constitutional
moments for the limits of sound constitutional design. Rules for constitutional amendment face
real difficulty in constituting and regulating moments of constitutive constitutional politics,
because at those moments, the concept of political community which those rules reflect is at
issue. Moreover, no matter how well designed, any set of rules governing constitutional
amendment will have a limiting case of some sort – a moment of failure built into the very design
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of those rules. And so the true lesson of constitutional moments may be some modesty on the
limits of constitutional forms to regulate constitutional politics – and on the limits of
constitutionalism itself.
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